Last
time we talked about the basic structure of the New York Stock Exchange
and American Stock Exchange, along with the basic workings of the
specialist system used on those exchanges. Today
I would like to cover the basics and give a brief history of the NASDAQ
trading system, traditionally known as the over-the-counter market.
This competing system has grown rapidly along with the growth in trade
at the traditional exchanges, and a lively debate can always be assured
when the conversation turns to which system is better.
The design of this system was thought to have several advantages over the exchange specialist systems, especially to those academics that look to promote increased competition in an industry. Instead of appointing one specialist with essentially monopoly power to set spread widths and control trading in a stock, literally anyone with the desire and the capital could become a market maker in any NASDAQ stock tomorrow. In the early 1970's much was written concerning the inherent monopoly power and unfairness in the single specialist system, really corresponding with similar attitudes and writings at the time directed towards trucking and airline cartels. Also, the early returns on the system reliability seemed to indicate that it was at least as reliable as the exchanges in regards to outages and occasions where stocks were forced to stop trading. The disadvantages to the system were really threefold. The lack of a centralized market made it impossible for a stock to open at a single price, something routine and required at a traditional exchange. On the opening at the NYSE it can be said that IBM opened at one price, and that all market orders and marketable limit orders are filled at that price on the opening. The NASDAQ makes no such claim, and in fact multiple price openings are the norm. Broker A can sell Oracle for a client at the opening at $17.10, while Broker B, putting in an opening buy order can and probably will be filled at $17.12. The second issue is one of trade-throughs. A person willing to pay $120 for IBM on the NYSE will be filled before the stock trades at $119 7/8. In fact, if a large block were to trade at $119 7/8, he may be included in the block at the lower price. On the NASDAQ system there is no such guarantee. Even if we discount for a moment nefarious motives, even a simple trade could have involved a trade-through. Broker A is trying to buy 500 shares of Oracle at $17.10, when Broker B receives an order to sell 1700 shares at the market. Broker B looks at his level 2 system and sees 500 shares bid for at $17.10 and 3000 shares bid at a different dealer at $17.08. Under the original design of the system broker B was free to sell all 1700 shares at the $17.08 price, and was under no obligation to split the trade to take out the smaller $17.10 bid. The
third disadvantage of the system is the difficulty in executing a
traditional market order. It is fairly simple and routine to send
relatively large market or limit orders to the NYSE, where there really
was no central place on the original NASDAQ system. The fulfillment
of such an order really involved the communication with one or more
dealers in an attempt to fill the order, with no guarantees that the
remaining dealers would maintain their bids and offers once the process
began. Other dealers were not above pulling their offers when they
noticed the offers of others on the system being taken. Many times
a large order from an investor or hedger from the options floor would
leave the execution firm with the question "Where exactly do
I go to fill this order?" As I said earlier, it is a matter of great debate whether the theoretically narrower bid-ask spreads brought about by the competing dealers made up for the design flaws in the original system. In any case, in parts 3 and 4 we will talk about recent enhancements to both systems, new off exchange systems, payments for order flow, as well as the landmark NASDAQ price fixing case of several years ago. |
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